Tiger Woods has been in the news in these last few weeks, though not in the way he has been in the past. As his personal travails have mounted, his endorsements have dropped off. Now comes a study by two professors at UC Davis, looking at the companies that sponsor Tiger.http://www.news.ucdavis.edu/search/printable_news.lasso?id=9352&table=newsThey find that the collective market value of these firms dropped $10-$12 billion between November 27, the fateful day when Tiger drove into a fire hydrant outside his house, to December 17 (thirteen trading days later).Note that Tiger is not the first...
Greece, EU and more on Implicit Backing for Debt
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Posted on 4:00 AM
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Building on the theme of my last post, i.e., that implicit guarantees for debt are common and potentially dangerous, Greece offers an illustration of both the upside and downside of implicit guarantees.Greece has been in the news as both S&P and Moody's have lowered its sovereign rating, from A- to BBB+ (for S&P) and from A2 to A1 (for Moody's). The harsher downgrade from S&P drew Greece's ire:http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/d4bdc8f2-eb13-11de-a0e1-00144feab49a,dwp_uuid=2b8f1fea-e570-11de-81b4-00144feab49a.htmlQuestions have been swirling about Greece defaulting and how the rest of the EU...
Dubai and the "implicit" guarantee
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Posted on 6:43 PM
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In the last two weeks, we have seen the damage wrought by the potential default of Dubai World, a Dubai-government controlled company that funded some of the most extravagant projects on the face of the earth over the last decade.http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aoFe12bwzZ2MWhile the magnitude of the default was large, it is interesting that it has shaken markets as much as it has. After all, there have been other large loan defaults in markets over the decades. So, why the panic? I think the reason lies in the unraveling of what I would call the "implicit guarantee".What...
The CRU Scandals: A Reflection on Academia
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Posted on 8:14 AM
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I am sure that you have been tracking the story of the hacked emails between top climatologists and the ensuing debate about whether those atop the discipline have stifled skeptics in the global warming debate. If you have not, here is a quick review:http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/11/21/AR2009112102186.html?nav=hcmoduleI do not intend to wade into that debate but the entire controversy has held up a mirror to academic research in general and I don't think the reflected image is flattering.Let us start with the ideal. Seekers of truth (Scientists, professors, Phd students......
A tax on financial transactions: Good or Bad Idea?
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Posted on 7:34 AM
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In recent days, we have heard talk from Congress about imposing a tax on financial transactions. While there has been heated debate on the topic, there seems be more smoke than substance in most of the arguments. This morning, Paul Krugman, who seems to have made a speedy and seamless transition from economist to polemicist, has an article on why such a tax is a good idea:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/27/opinion/27krugman.html?ref=opinionAs always, Krugman sees the villains here (the speculators, who else?), decides that this tax will not have much effect on the good guys (a group of long term...
Macro Bets: A general framework..
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Posted on 6:59 AM
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As many of you are aware, I am not a great believer in macro bets but I recognis4 that there are investors out there who not only like to make big bets on interest rates, currencies or commodities, but also make tons of money in the process. In fact, the subject of my last post, John Paulson, made a macro bet on housing and it paid off big time for him. Consequently, I thought it would make sense for me to put down my thoughts on macro bets.Should you make macro bets?The old rule in investing applies. If you are going to make macro bets, you need to bring something unique to the table - a competitive...
The secrets behind John Paulson's success...
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Posted on 4:51 PM
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The banking and credit crisis of 2008 had few heroes and lots of investing legends who were humbled. Very few of these so called experts saw the crisis coming, and even those who did were unable to act on that belief.One exception is John Paulson, a hedge fund manager/investor based in New York. He saw a bubble in the housing market in 2006 and created a hedge fund to bet on the bubble bursting; what made his bet unique was that his use of the Credit Default Swap (CDS) market to bet that sub-prime securities would collapse and he was right. Greg Zuckerman, a reporter at the Wall Street Journal,...
The Agency for Financial Stability? Good idea?
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Posted on 3:53 PM
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In today's big news for bankers, Senator Chris Dodd has announced his intent to create an Agency for Financial Stability, which will be responsible for "identifying and removing systemic risks in the economy".http://online.wsj.com/article/SB125786789140341325.htmlWow! What a brilliant idea? What next? How about an Agency for Everlasting Economic Growth? And an Agency for No More Defaults? Or an Agency for Full Employment?The key part of this proposal is that it will strip away some of the powers of the Federal Reserve over banking and move them to this agency. Implicit in this proposal is the...
Bad companies and good investments...
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Posted on 12:19 PM
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One of the big news items of the week is Berkshire Hathaway's acquisition of a Burlington Northern, a large US railroad.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/11/04/business/04deal.htmlSince Berkshire Hathaway is Warren Buffett's brainchild, this has provided a platform for many analysts to read the tea leaves. Here is some of the spin that I have seen and what I think about the spin.A significant number of the analysts have argued that Buffett is making a bet on the US economy recovering by making this investment. I find this puzzling at two levels. First, if you were going to make a bet on the US economy,...
Insider Trading: My Perspective..
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Posted on 1:56 PM
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The recent arrest of Raj Rajaratnam, the founder of Galleon Group , a hedge fund, on charges of insider trading has generated responses from across the spectrum. At the one end, it is evoking the usual breast beating about insider trading and how unfair it is to the rest of us "non-inside" investors.http://www.businessinsider.com/henry-blodget-moral-of-galleon-insider-trading-bust-only-fools-try-to-beat-the-street-2009-10At the other, there are some who are pointing out that this case illustrates how ineffective insider trading laws are and that they should perhaps be abandoned.http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704224004574489324091790350.htmlIt...
Equity Risk Premiums: An Update
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Posted on 8:07 AM
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As many of you are probably aware, I am fixated on equity risk premiums. To me they are at the center of almost every debate about equity markets - whether stocks are too low or too high, whether current market conditions are the norm or an aberration, and whether equity investors truly understand the risk associated with investing in equities.I had a few posts during the crisis, where I noted that the implied equity risk premium for the S&P 500 had climbed at a rate never seen before in history during the twelve weeks between September 12, 2008 and late November. In fact, I reported an implied...
Bond Ratings: Why, how and what next?
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Posted on 6:58 AM
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In the aftermath of the bond market calamities (for investors and issuing companies), the ratings agencies (S&P, Moody's and Fitch) have come under assault from all sides. Legislators and regulators have accused them of being too close to the companies that they rate, with the implication that companies/bonds are being over rated. Academics have piled on, arguing that there is little information in bond ratings and that ratings agencies offer poor and delayed assessments of default risk. Finally, a few former employees have come forward with claims that bond ratings, at least in some cases,...
Crisis Lessons: Presentation...
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Posted on 12:32 PM
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A few posts ago, I mentioned that I was working on a presentation reflecting the lessons that I learned from the crisis. I had also promised to post the presentation when it was ready. You can get it be clicking on the link below:Market Revelations: Lessons learned, unlearned and relearned from the CrisisWhile you can read about the specific lessons that I have taken away from the last year in the presentation, here are the general points I want to make:1. These are the lessons that I have learned. In other words, this is my personal odyssey and I do not expect everyone to have learned these lessons,...
Leveraged Buyouts
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Posted on 5:02 PM
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Yesterday's New York Times had a story (a sad one) on the troubles at Simmons, a mattress company with a long and illustrious history in the United States.http://www.nytimes.com/2009/10/05/business/economy/05simmons.htmlIn short, the company was targeted for a leveraged buyout by Thomas H. Lee Partners, a private equity firm, in a transaction that went awry, partly because of miscalculations by the investors and partly because of the market crisis. The article is clear about who the "bad guys" in this story are and it is the private equity investors, who profited while a good company and its employees...
The dangers of relative valuation
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Posted on 6:46 AM
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In my last post on Twitter, I hypothesized that the valuation of Twitter was based upon what investors had assigned as a value for Facebook a few months earlier. I want to make clear that I am not suggesting that this is a good way to value businesses but that it is the status quo.With relative valuation, the dangers of a bad initial valuation cascading into subsequent valuations is high and they get worse when the initial valuation is of a large company (Facebook is large, by the standards of networking sites) and done by what is viewed as a reputable source (private equity investors have an...
What is Twitter worth?
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Posted on 3:41 AM
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Yesterday's big news story, at least in valuation circles, is that private equity investors have invested $ 100 million in Twitter for a roughly 10% stake, suggesting a billion-dollar valuation for the nascent company.http://blogs.wsj.com/deals/2009/09/24/breaking-news-twitter-to-raise-100-million-from-insight-t-rowe-price-other-investors/Twitter, for those who may be living in the middle ages, has about 30 million members who post short messages (less than 140 characters) that other members can read (if they choose to follow your tweeting). Every celebrity (sports, politics, media) seems to be...
Buybacks and Stock Prices..
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Posted on 7:17 AM
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Floyd Norris has an article in the New York Times on stock buybacks:http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/19/business/19charts.html?scp=1&sq=buybacks&st=SearchHe notes that buybacks are high when stock prices are high and that they fall off when stock prices are low. His conclusion is that this is irrational because companies should be buying back more stock when the price is low and less when the stock is high. While there is a point to his argument, there are two points he is missing:1. Buybacks are more about returning cash to stockholders and changing financial leverage than making judgments...
A Risk Argument: Democracies versus Dictatorships
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Posted on 7:23 AM
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A few days ago, Tom Friedman, the columnist for the New York Times, and best-selling author of books on globalization, evoked controversy when he opined that "one party autocracy" is not too bad if it is led by a "reasonably enlightened group of people, as China today". To be honest, I have never found Friedman's work to be particularly thought provoking, nor do I much care for his characterizations of globalization: flat earth, fat earth, round earth, whatever.... . However, his article did start me thinking about whether businesses face less risk or more risk in a democracy than in a dictatorship.As...
One year later: The lessons from the crisis
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Posted on 6:58 AM
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It is hard to believe that it has been a year since the crisis started - September 15,2008, to be precise. The papers are full of retrospectives, with opinions often overwhelming the facts. I am working on my book on what I learned from the crisis in terms of how I approached valuation and corporate finance. I will post the presentation that I am putting together sometime in the next week.While most of the articles in the media this week either rehash old stories or focus on human interest (such as looking at where Lehman's employees are today), there are two that I found particularly thought...
Access to webcasts...
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Posted on 11:22 AM
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I have been web casting my classes for a few years now and it has always been a struggle maintaining open access. New York University would prefer to have the web casts be behind a password and I would prefer that they be open access. I think I have the upper hand, at least for the moment.I do know that access to the web casts has been curtailed over the last few days. However, this is more the result of IT system upgrades than a deliberate attempt by NYU to restrict access. The problem should be fixed by next week and access should resume. I am sor...
Commodity companies and commodity dependent markets
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Posted on 11:00 AM
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My trip to Peru started me thinking about commodity based companies and markets and how best to value them. It is fairly obvious that the value of a commodity company will be a function of the price of the commodity. As oil prices go up and down, the prices of oil companies will vary. Embedded in this obvious relationship, though, are several interesting valuation issues:a. What is the best way to forecast future commodity prices?There are two basic approaches. One is to trust price cycles and look at average prices across time. Implicitly, we assume that commodity price cycles are pre-determined...
Peru and Brazil
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Posted on 11:06 AM
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I just got back from my trip to Peru and Brazil. My first stop was Lima, and I had a blast. The people are friendly and hospitable, the weather is balmy and the food is extraordinary. While I have explored only a small sliver of the country, my impression of the Peruvian market is that it is commodity driven. As the price of copper and silver goes, so goes Peru's stock market. As a result, the market resembles a roller coaster. Peru has been among the best performing markets in recent years, as commodity prices have been on an up cycle. While I am not a pessimist by nature, it is inevitable that...
Emerging Markets... and maturity....
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Posted on 11:33 PM
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Sorry about the long hiatus between posts but I took family time off to go to California. I am three weeks away from a new semester starting but I am on my way to Peru and Brazil over the next few days to talk about valuation. I have never been to Peru before and am looking forward to seeing Lima for the first time. I have been to Brazil once or twice each year since 1998 and I am looking forward to this trip just as much. While I will never know as much about Brazil as I would like to, I have had the opportunity to watch the market change over the last decade. While each emerging market...
Behavioral Corporate Finance 1: The Objective in Decision Making:
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Posted on 4:40 AM
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Every business needs a central objective that drives decision making. In traditional corporate finance, that objective is to maximize the value of the firm. For publicly traded firms, this objective often is modified to maximizing stock prices. In effect, any decision that increases stock prices is viewed as a good decision and any decision that reduces stock prices is a bad one. Implicitly, we are assuming that investors are (for the most part) rational and that markets are efficient, that stock prices reflect the long term value of equity and that bond holders are fully protected from expropriation.A...
Behavioral finance and corporate finance
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Posted on 9:27 AM
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I wrote my first corporate finance book in the 1990s and Corporate Finance remains my favorite subject to teach, since it forces me to think about how businesses should be run and not just about investing in these businesses. It is a constant reminder that it is great business people who create strong economies and not great investors. As a linear thinker who likes my ducks in a row, my vision of corporate finance has always been built around maximizing the value of a business (rather than stock prices) and how investing, financing and dividend policy should be set by a firm (private or public),...
Losers and Winners: The inevitable consequence of risk taking...
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Posted on 2:03 PM
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I am still astounded by the incapacity of some in the financial media to see the obvious. As an example, consider this article from the Wall Street Journal today:http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204005504574233831651104814.htmlIf you cannot read the whole article, you are not missing a whole lot since I can summarize the basic theme as follows. A lot of the funds that were in the bottom 10% of last year's performers are in the top 25% of performers this year. As my 10-year old would say "Duh". Why is this a surprise? A risk taking fund will move back and forth between the best and...
Valuing declining and distressed companies
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Posted on 12:39 PM
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In my last post, I noted the difficulties that we face when valuing young companies. In particular, I noted both the difficulties we face in estimating cash flows for these firms and factoring in the possibility of failure. In many ways, we face the same problems at the other end of the life cycle, when valuing firms at the other end of the life cycle. In particular, declining and distressed firms share five characteristics: 1. Stagnant or declining revenues: Perhaps the most telling sign of a company in decline is the inability to increase revenues over extended periods, even when times...